After Deleting LeakCanary, I Built My Own with Trae: The Hard Part Isn't Analyzing the Heap, It's Deciding When to Dump
Privacy compliance can invalidate a popular debugging tool overnight, and the fix is not to find a shinier analyzer but to design the trigger and the data-flow carefully. This account shows how to build a minimal, auditable leak detector that respects data boundaries, and how to turn a one-off AI-assisted project into a repeatable, CI-checked workflow.
When a security audit revealed that LeakCanary's debug-mode heap dumps contained plaintext ID card numbers, patient names, and an unexpired token, the only responsible move was to delete the dependency. But the app immediately started OOM-crashing without any leak notifications. The answer wasn't a better heap analyzer; it was building a custom detector that understands the real problem: knowing when to dump, not how to analyze the dump.
The resulting system, developed in twelve interaction rounds with Trae, mirrors LeakCanary's architecture but strips it to the minimum: a `KeyedWeakReference` probe watching for weakly-reachable objects, a trigger that waits five seconds, forces GC, and counts only objects still alive after a second queue poll, and a dump that runs on a background thread with primitive-array zeroing before the file ever leaves the device. A 400-line Python script performs the BFS to find the shortest reference path from GC roots, with three-state leak annotation and array-index normalization.
The process itself is as instructive as the code. The author documents how the trigger was the missing insight all along, why weakly-reachable beats `finalize()` and direct weak references, how the hprof binary format hides pitfalls in its un-length-bounded sub-records, and how the entire 12-round prompt-and-verify workflow was codified into a Trae Skill with its own acceptance gates, privacy red lines, and adversarial review checklist.
The single most transferable idea is treating the trigger as the product: decide when to capture evidence before deciding how to analyze it, and the analysis becomes tractable.
Privacy compliance is now a first-class engineering constraint on debugging tools, not an afterthought: the same dump that helps you find a leak can expose user data, so the tool must be designed with schema-aware redaction built in.
Building a minimal replacement for a mature library forces deeper understanding of the problem than using the library ever did; the author's rewrite of LeakCanary's core in a few hundred lines clarifies what the original tool's real value is.
AI-assisted development changes the nature of debugging: the hard work is specifying the contract (when to dump, what to strip, which line to change) and verifying the output, not writing the parsing code.
A measurable boundary—like an explicit error on unknown hprof tags or a script that fails when stripping is bypassed—is worth more than a hundred lines of defensive logic, because it prevents silent wrong answers.
The author's honest reporting of unresolved numbers (the 11% false-positive rate on the low-memory device) shows that a tool's validation is only as trustworthy as its refusal to tune the metric into passing.